NMSC Explains When EMTs May Draw Blood for Implied Consent Act

In State v. Adams, the New Mexico Supreme Court explained when an EMT is authorized to draw blood under the Implied Consent Act. Chief Justice Vigil, writing for a 4-0 Court, explained that while an EMT certification by itself is not enough, an EMT may draw blood when employed by a hospital or physician if they possess the adequate education and experience to perform blood draws.

Background

In this case, an officer pulled the defendant over on suspicion of driving under the influence. After the defendant failed field sobriety tests and admitted alcohol and drug use, the officer brought the defendant to a hospital. There, an “emergency department technician,” also licensed as an emergency medical technician (EMT), performed a blood draw test for the purpose of a DWI investigation. The test results revealed that Defendant’s blood was negative for alcohol but positive for marijuana-related metabolites, benzodiazepines, and synthetic opioids. 

The State charged defendant with DUI. Defendant sought to suppress the evidence from the blood draw, arguing that the EMT was not qualified to draw blood. After the magistrate denied the motion, defendant pleaded no contest, reserving his right to appeal.

On appeal, the district court reached a different result. Based on a prior court of appeals case, the district court concluded that EMTs were not authorized to perform blood draws under the Implied Consent Act. The State appealed, and the court of appeal reversed, concentrating on the EMT’s employment by the hospital and his experience and training to draw blood. Defendant petitioned for certiorari, and the Court granted his appeal.

The Court’s Analysis

Under the Implied Consent Act, any person who operates a motor vehicle in New Mexico is deemed to have consented to chemical tests of his blood for the purpose of determining drug or alcohol content. Section 66-8-103 states that “[o]nly a physician, licensed professional or practical nurse or laboratory technician or technologist employed by a hospital or physician shall withdraw blood from any person in the performance of a blood-alcohol test.” The issue before the Court was whether the EMTs who had drawn the blood qualified as “laboratory technicians.”

Defendant argued that a literal, plain meaning reading of “laboratory technician” required that the EMT have actual laboratory experience, a background in laboratory science, or laboratory skills beyond the skill of drawing blood. The State, in contrast, focused on the “technician” part of the phrase, arguing that the EMT was a technician because she was trained and employed to perform specialized tasks, including drawing blood. In light of these arguments, the Court concluded that the term was susceptible to two or more meanings and therefore ambiguous.

Because the term was ambiguous, the Court considered the legislative intent. On this point, Defendant argued that by listing specific categories of persons who could draw blood, the legislature showed its intent that persons not in those categories should be excluded. The State, on the other hand, cited prior case law identifying the purpose of the statute as that of deterring drunk drivers and aiding in discovering and removing the intoxicated driver from the highways.

The Court found the State’s view persuasive. It concluded that the statute should be broadly interpreted to permit blood draws by qualified medical professionals, even if those professionals have job titles that are not explicitly identified in the statute. This result was consistent with prior decisions, which had broadened the categories of persons authorized to draw blood, and better met the established legislative intent.

Finally, the Court easily distinguished the case the district court had relied on in suppressing the evidence. In that case, the question was whether an EMT qualification alone was enough to permit the EMT to perform blood draws. Here, in contrast, the EMT had extensive training and had performed hundreds or possibly thousands of blood draws. The evidence was overwhelming and uncontested that this was a part of the EMTs job and that the EMT had performed it correctly. The training, in short, was the difference between this case and the older case.

The Court’s Approach to Interpreting the Statute

It is worth comparing the Court’s approach here with its last published opinion, Leger v. Gerety. Leger, like this case, required the Court to interpret a single sentence from a statute. In both cases the sentence was fairly short, and in both cases the first step was to determine whether the statutory language was ambiguous.

Here, the Court quickly determined that the language was ambiguous because it was susceptible to more than one meaning. This lead to a focus on the legislative intent (which in this case had been decided by prior decisions). Once the intent was identified it was straightforward for the Court to conclude which of the possible meanings of the statutes best furthered that intent.

In Leger, on the other hand, the reasoning was not nearly so straightforward. There, the majority believed that the language was unambiguous despite a considerable judicial divide as to what it might mean. This lead to a relatively short analysis, followed by a much longer attempt at refuting the dissent and the court of appeals’ majority opinion. To me, this sort of analysis feels somewhat arbitrary, depending ultimately on whether a single judge in the 3-2 majority believed the language was ambiguous. Acknowledging the ambiguity, on the other hand, produces what to my mind is a much more persuasive opinion. Reading the two opinions back to back reinforces something I learned during my clerkships–if you have to ask whether the language is ambiguous, it probably is.

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