NMSC: Arrest Made by Non-commissioned, Volunteer Officer Violated State Constitution

A New Mexico statute provides that “No person shall be arrested for violating the Motor Vehicle Code or other law relating to motor vehicles punishable as a misdemeanor except by a commissioned, salaried peace officer who, at the time of arrest, is wearing a uniform clearly indicating the peace officer’s official status.” In addition, Article 2, Section 10 of the New Mexico constitution provides protections similar to, but often greater than, the Fourth Amendment. In State v. Wright, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that DUI evidence obtained as a result of an arrest made by a non-commissioned, volunteer officer must be suppressed under Article 2, Section 10.

Background

This case arose out of a DUI traffic stop. Reserve Deputy Thompson, who was not a salaried, commissioned officer, observed a truck driving erratically and suspected the driver of being intoxicated. While following the truck, he called Deputy Ron Fulfer, who told him to follow the truck and that he would be “right there.” Thompson followed the truck until Defendant arrived at her house, at which point he blocked the vehicle in the driveway. Defendant had a low speed collision with another vehicle in her driveway and almost backed into Thompson’s vehicle.

Thompson got out of his vehicle and shined his spotlight at Defendant, who was still in her truck. He spoke with Defendant, who said that she had had four beers. Thompson asked her to stay in her truck and told her that another deputy was on the way. Five minutes later, Deputy Fulfer arrived. Defendant failed field sobriety tests and refused a breathalyzer. Later, at the Sheriff’s office, blood tests showed that Defendant had a 0.18 blood alcohol level.

At trial, Defendant sought to suppress the evidence as the result of an unlawful arrest. The district court concluded that Thompson’s instruction to Defendant to stay in the truck for five minutes was an arrest, and that the arrest was illegal because Thompson was not a salaried, commissioned officer. It further observed that but for the unlawful detention, Defendant would have gone into her house before Fulfer arrived. Concluding that the arrested violated Article 2, Section 10 of the New Mexico constitution, the Court suppressed the evidence.

On appeal, the Court of appeals, in a divided opinion, reversed. The majority reasoned that the State’s interest in keeping drunk drivers off of the roadway far outweighed whatever minimal privacy intrusion Defendant experienced. The majority also reasoned that exigent circumstances justified the temporary detention because Defendant might have driven away or gone into her home (where the evidence of her drinking would metabolize away). Notably, this view of the encounter was at odds with the factual findings of the district court. Judge Vargas dissented, viewing the facts as they were found by the district court and noting the intent of the statute to protect the public’s interest “to be free from arrest by untrained citizens,” would have balanced the interests differently and reversed.

Analysis

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer two questions: (1) was the statutory violation also a violation of Article 2, Section 10, and (2) did the court of appeals show proper deference to the district court’s factual findings and properly balance the privacy and societal interests at issue?

As to the first issue, Defendant argued that the court of appeals had given no weight to the statutory violation, which protected important privacy interests from government overreach. The State conceded the violation but argued that the arrest was nonetheless reasonable in light of the State’s strong interest in preventing DUI.

Often, an Article II Section 10 case will involve deciding whether New Mexico provides increased protections versus the Fourth Amendment. Here, however, the Court of Appeals had already done that in a case called Rodarte. The Rodarte standard, based on Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, requires the court to balance “on the one hand, the degree to which the arrest intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other had, the degree to which the arrest is needed for the promotion of legitimate government interests.”

The Court began with the second prong, noting that the statute was evidence of the Legislature’s determination that “the liberty to be free from an arrest by anyone other than a commissioned, salaried peace officer for violating a law relating to motor vehicles that is punishable as a misdemeanor outweighs the State’s perceived governmental interests in allowing an arrest to be made by anyone else.” But it also noted that at the time of the arrest, the defendant was off the road, parked at her home, and blocked in, with no intent to flee. Thus, the DUI had ended, and the State could no longer argue it had an interest in preventing DUI or maintaining highway safety.

The Court balanced this against the intrusion on Defendant’s privacy interests. The volunteer officer had pursued Defendant up her driveway, shone a spotlight on her, and instructed her to remain in her truck. The Court did not opine as to how severe it viewed these intrusions, though it did note that the volunteer officer had also intruded upon her ability to enter her home and move freely within her property. But it clearly found that the intrusions outweighed the state’s interest in “an unauthorized arrest that promoted neither the State’s interest in deterring drunk driving nor the State’s interest in maintaining highway safety.” Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeals’ opinion that the evidence should not have been suppressed.

In reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court also took a moment to discuss the court of appeals majority’s treatment of the district court’s factual findings. The Court noted that the majority had “ignored” the finding that but for the illegal detention, Defendant would have gone inside, as well as the finding that the volunteer officer did not believe the Defendant intended to flee. Moreover, the majority had included material that was not in the findings of facts, such as that the Defendant was speeding or driving erratically. Factual findings are entitled to significant deference on appeal, and the Court did not believe that the court of appeals had shown the appropriate deference.

Ultimately, this decision employs an existing test to evaluate the facts of a specific case. Viewed in that light, this is not a significant change in the law, but rather the Court exercising its power to correct errors. Nevertheless, it is an important reminder both of the Rodarte balancing test and of the importance of standards of review–in particular, the deference due to factual findings.

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