NMSC: Aggravated Fleeing Statute Does Not Require Actual Endangerment

In State v. Vest, the New Mexico Supreme Court once again revisits the aggravated fleeing from a law enforcement officer statute. Not long ago, in State v. Montano, the Court discused the “marked” car and “uniformed” officer requirements of the statute . Here, the Court answers the question of whether the fleeing defendant must actually put persons in danger, or merely driver in a manner that poses a risk to the community.

Background

This case concerns a high speed car chase. A police officer came upon a car that was apparently involved in a drug deal in the early hours of the morning. One of the car’s occupants ran to the officer, informing him that the the other occupant had threatened him with a knife and was stealing his car. The car then drove off, and a high speed chase ensued. Due to the early hour, however, there were no other persons in the vicinity of the pursuit.

A jury convicted the driver of aggravated fleeing a law enforcement officer. The court of appeals reversed, holding that despite the dangerous driving, there was no evidence that any person was actually endangered by the driving. The Supreme Court took cert to decide whether the statute required actual endangerment.

Analysis

This case required the Court to construe the aggravated fleeing statute. The Court framed the question as whether careless driving “in a manner that endangers the life of another person,” § 30-22-1.1, is satisfied only when a specific individual is exposed to life-threatening harm as a result of a defendant’s conduct, or whether this element is satisfied if the defendant drives in such a careless way that it exposes the public to serious risk of danger. Focusing on the word “endanger,” the court of appeals had concluded that the defendant must actually (not potentially) endanger a person.

The goal of statutory interpretation is to further the legislature’s intent. The process begins with the plain meaning of the statute and, unless the statute is ambiguous, often ends there. The Court begin by looking at the phrase “in a manner,” determining that it was aimed at a particular way of behaving–dangerous driving.

One important rule of interpretation is that a statute should not be interpreted in a way that makes part of it useless. The Court believed that by focusing on whether the conduct “endangered” anyone, the court of appeals had read out the “in a manner” language in the statute. Under the court of appeals’ interpretation, a person could drive in a manner that endangered the public so long as they did not actually endanger anyone. This rendered the “in a manner” language useless, and was therefore not a correct interpretation of the law.

The Court also looked at the legislative intent behind the statute. The Court agreed with the court of appeals that the statute expressed a legislative intent to more severely punish people who jeopardize the safety of others while fleeing from law enforcement officers. But it disagreed that that purpose was only served when another person happened to be nearby. Like drunk driving laws, the purpose was to deter the risky behavior, not a particular result.

Having decided the meaning of the statute, the Court easily disposed of the second issue. The record contained sufficient evidence for a jury to convict on the aggravated fleeing count. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the conviction.

The Dissent

Justice Thomson wrote separately in dissent. Like the majority, Justice Thomson performed a plain language analysis of the statute; however, he reached a different result. Focusing on the phrase of the statute “endangers the life of another person“, the dissent observed that the majority effectively eliminated the requirement that the “life of another person” must be endangered. The dissent would have affirmed the court of appeals’ decision.

Justice Thomson raised a variety of arguments in support of his position. In particular, he looked to legislative history to show that the Legislature intended to require actual endangerment. To an appellate lawyer, this is possibly the most interesting part of the opinion. The dissent points to earlier versions of the bill that did not pass as evidence that the Legislature had rejected the interpretation adopted by the Court in this opinion. However, the majority expressly rejects this approach.

New Mexico, unlike the United States, does not maintain legislative history. Accordingly, there is no direct way to know why the legislature did not pass a particular bill. The Court cautioned against looking for legislative intent in the language of draft bills or proposed statutory language. Instead, the correct sources of such intent are the various enacted versions of the statute and similar statutes over time.

I’m not sure whether I prefer the construction of the majority or the dissent. In any event, the holding of this case is clear enough. If I had to guess, however, this opinion will be cited in the future more for its comments on legislative history than for its interpretation of the aggravated fleeing statute.

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